This study proposes a dynamic model of rebellion, where three players individually decide to challenge their common adversary. It is formally demonstrated that the pattern of rebellion is determined endogenously, depending on the challengers'resolve and strength. In other words, a stronger challenger with more resolve tends to …ght earlier than others do. (JEL: D74; F51)
Introduction
While some scholars regard rebellion as a coordination game, where rebels strive to synchronize their challenges (Granovetter 1978; Weingast 1995 Weingast , 1997 Weingast , 2005 ; Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan 2007; Fearon 2011), others presume a rebellion occurs in an uncoordinated manner, where a leader ("vanguard") tries to mobilize opportunistic followers (Roemer 1985 ; Ginkel and Smith 1999; Bueno de Mesquita 2010). These two distinct approaches have contrasting implications-according to the former, a rebellion breaks out with simultaneous challenges, while the latter suggests a rebellion escalates gradually with sequential challenges.
This theoretical discrepancy is reconciled by Nakao (2015) , who endogenized the sequence and timing of challenges in order to demonstrate that a rebellion can occur in either a coordinated or an uncoordinated manner in light of two challengers, depending on their resolve and strength. However, his analysis with more than two challengers remains informal. In extending his model by incorporating three challengers, this study formally analyzes four patterns of rebellion: (i) snowballing rebellion, which escalates gradually as more challengers are drawn in (e.g., Napoleonic Wars); (ii) catalytic rebellion, in which an instigator provokes a galvanizing event to inspire all others' simultaneous challenges (Boshin War); (iii) partially coordinated rebellion, which is initiated by a few of the ex post challengers (American Civil War); (iv) fully coordinated rebellion, in which all the challengers …ght in unison (American Revolution). By delivering the condition for each of the patterns, we show that among three challengers, a stronger challenger with more resolve tends to …ght earlier than others do. Even with more than three challengers, a rebellion can still be categorized into one of these four patterns.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and its assumptions are shown in Section 3. Section 4 portrays four patterns of rebellion. Sections 5 and 6 analyze the players'behavior and solve the model. Section 7 o¤ers numerical example. Section 8 concludes.
A Model with Three Challengers
In the model, there are three players (i; j 2 f ; ; g with i 6 = j), who are discontented with their government. In the …rst period t = 1, each player decides to "…ght" or "acquiesce" to the government. In addition, in subsequent periods t = 2; 3; : : : ; any player who has not yet fought the government decides whether or not to …ght. If player i chooses to …ght, in ‡icting a lump-sum cost c i > 0, the battle results in one of i's "win,""holdout,"and "loss"in that period, depending on the government's (later speci…ed) military strength G relative to the rebels'. If i "wins" ("loses"), the war ends with i's one-o¤ gain w i > 0 (loss l i > 0). If i "holds out" in a battle, the war continues to the next period. The payo¤ from "acquiesce"is normalized to zero.
Once a player starts …ghting, he cannot withdraw its army, and the battle evolves until the player "wins"or "loses"the war. In other words, a player's decision is when to …ght or permanently acquiesce. On the other hand, the government is assumed not to make any strategic decision. The game continues until every player's battle ends decisively with "win"or "loss."
The model captures the uncertainty of the government's strength. The players do not know the government's true strength g, which is binary: weak or strong (g 2 fg W ; g S g with 0 < g W < g S ), but they know the prior probability distribution of the government's strength Pr(g). Each player i is given a parameter r i > 0, which denotes i's strength. A battle outcome depends on the government's relative military strength:
where I i is an indicator which takes the value zero if player i acquiesces or has fought but lost the war (i.e., I i = 0 for i's "acquiesce"or "loss"), while it takes the value one if i is …ghting the government or has won the war (I i = 1 for i's "win"or "holdout"). This means that as more players challenge the government, the balance of power shifts away from the government, but it shifts back if a player is defeated. The power balances perfectly when G = 0. Given the relative strength G, "nature" determines player i's battle outcomes in period t (h ijt 2 fwin; hold; lossg). When two or more players are simultaneously …ghting the government in a period, they are assumed to operate the same campaign; that is, their battle outcomes are identical probabilistic events (e.g., h jt = h jt ).
Once a player initiates a war, other players infer the government's true strength g from a series of reports from battle…elds. By Bayes'rule, and 's belief based on 's battles until period T can be shown as:
where
is the weak (strong) government's strength relative to i, Pr(h ijt jG) is the per-period probability of h ijt conditional on G, and H ijT is i's history (hold ij1 ; hold ij2 ;
; h ijT ) with h ijT 2 fwin; hold; lossg. Given G, i's per-period payo¤ from …ghting can be denoted as:
while i's continuation payo¤ as:
Assumptions
Assumptions are introduced as follows.
Assumption 1 For i; j 2 f ; ; g, r i + r j < g W .
By Assumption 1, any pairwise coalition is weaker than the government for sure. decrease with G until they reach zero. (iii) Pr (holdjG) decreases with jGj : (iv) For i; j 2 f ; ; g,
. By Assumption 2, (i) no pairwise coalition can defeat a strong government; (ii) stronger players are more likely to beat the government; (iii) a battle tends to remain indecisive if the players are as strong as the government; (iv) two players'joint …ghting is as informative as a single player's …ghting. 1 By Assumptions 1 and 2-(iii), any two players'"holdout"suggests the government to be weak and thus motivates the other player to join the rebellion. 
By Assumption 3, (i) and of the full coalition are willing (unwilling) to …ght the weak (strong) government; (ii) and are unwilling to …ght once is defeated.
By Assumption 4, (i) both and would like to acquiesce at least once if alone provokes a (snowballing or catalytic) rebellion; (ii) would like to acquiesce at least once if and jointly provoke a (partially coalitional) rebellion. 2 
Four Patterns of Rebellion
We consider the following four patterns of rebellion. The …rst pattern depicts the escalation of rebellion in sequence (Figure 1 ).
De…nition 1 A rebellion is snowballing if it is initiated solely by , followed by and . If "wins," and simultaneously …ght. If "holds out" for T periods, …ghts. After 's participation, if and "win" or "hold out" until period T (T < T ), …ghts. Otherwise, and acquiesce. 2 To interpret Assumption 4-(i), if …ghts alone in the …rst period, it will be immediately defeated by the government with probability P g2fg W ;g S g Pr (g) Pr (lossjG ); then, i 2 f ; g will lose the opportunity of having a payo¤ i (G ; ; ) c i . The assumption determines this expected payo¤ to be negative, implying that by acquiescing once, and could avoid this negative payo¤ (resulting from …ghting a strong government).
The second pattern proceeds as one player …ghts alone, and the two others then act in unison.
De…nition 2 A rebellion is catalytic if initiates the …ghting, and then and simultaneously participate, conditional on 's "win" or T ; rounds of "holdout." Otherwise, and acquiesce.
The third pattern describes a rebellion that is provoked by a two-player coalition, after which the third player may …ght.
De…nition 3 A rebellion is partially coalitional if it is initiated jointly by two players and . In this rebellion, the third player …ghts if coalition -"wins" or if it "holds out" until period T . Otherwise, acquiesces.
The last pattern takes the simplest form.
De…nition 4 A rebellion is fully coalitional if all three players …ght simultaneously.
Lagged Challenges
We solve the game by backward induction. The following lemma shows the last challenger 's rational decision.
Lemma 1 Suppose that initiates a rebellion and joins in after 's T rounds of "holdout." (i) If T is so large that
is willing to …ght simultaneously with or even before . Otherwise, continues to acquiesce at least until T + 1: Then, (ii) after and "win," …ghts immediately, (iii) after and "lose," acquiesces forever, and (iv) as long as and "hold out," acquiesces until period T (T < T ) and then …ghts in period T + 1, where T equals the smallest T such that Inequality (1) holds with Pr gjhold ; jT instead of Pr gjhold jT . (v) T is independent of T .
Proof. (i) With Inequality (1), …ghts immediately, given hold jT . Otherwise, acquiesces once, given hold jT . (ii, iii) By Assumption 2-(i), and 's "win" guarantees that the government is weak. Then, 's sequential rationality after and 's "win" ("loss") is given by Assumption 3-(i) (3-(ii)). (iv) As and hold out longer, Pr g W jhold ; jT converges to one by Assumptions 1 and 2-(iii), and will …ght in some period T + 1 by Assumption 3-(i). (v) T is independent of T because 's payo¤ is independent of T by Assumption 2-(iv).
If Inequality (1) does not hold, would …ght after , escalating the rebellion as if it snowballs (De…nition 1). With Inequality (1), two possibilities emerge: if is willing to …ght simultaneously with , the rebellion spreads catalytically (De…nition 2); if is willing to …ght earlier than , we can replace with , so that without loss of generality, we presume that T T . (By Assumption 4-(i), it never happens that both and are willing to …ght earlier than the other.)
Given 's history h jT and 's rational strategy, chooses the best time to …ght.
Lemma 2 Suppose that initiates a rebellion and adopts the strategy of Lemma 1.
(i) After 's "win," …ghts simultaneously with .
(ii) After 's "loss," acquiesces forever. (iii) During 's "holdout," the timing of 's …ghting T + 1 is determined as the smallest T + 1 such that V jT +1 hold jT jT V jT + hold jT jT for any 2; where V jT + hold jT jT is 's expected payo¤ from …ghting in T + with 's participation from T based on hold jT :
(iv) During 's "holdout," …ghts before (i.e., T < T ) if T satis…es V jT hold jT 1 jT
Proof. (i, ii) Group 's decision after 's "win" ("loss") is given by Assumption 3-(i) (3-(ii)). (iii) To determine T , compares its expected payo¤s from …ghting in all future periods (T + for any 2). (Unlike , 's incentive to …ght does not monotonically increase owing to 's lagged …ghting at T + 1.) (iv) Inequality (2) checks 's incentive at T . If it holds, …ghts at T instead of at T + 1, or T < T :
When determining the time to …ght, confronts a dilemma-as delays …ghting, becomes more likely to be defeated (shown in the LHS of Inequality (2)), but 's support will be introduced sooner (in the RHS). When the former incentive outweighs the latter, joins 's rebellion.
Initial Challenge and Coalition
Taking into account and 's strategies in Lemmas 1 and 2, decides whether to provoke a rebellion. 
Proof. We check the incentive compatibility for each player. (i) For , given T , chooses T such that T < T if Inequality (1) does not hold. (ii) For , given T , chooses T such that T < T if Inequality (2) holds. In addition, acquiesces at least once (Assumption 4-(i)). (iii) The rebellion assumes a snowballing pattern if it is initiated by , or if V Sn j1 (T ; T ) 0. If "wins," and immediately …ght (Assumptions 2-(i) and 3-(i)). If "loses,"they never …ght (Assumption 3-(ii)).
Proposition 1 suggests that sequential spreading of rebel movements is most likely when the three players are heterogeneous in terms of strength and resolve: the …rst player leads the rebellion; then, the second overpowers the third. For instance, in period one, while is willing to …ght, the others are not (Assumption 4-(i)); then, in period T + 1, while is willing to …ght, is not (Inequality (2) holds, but not (1)). These time lags in …ghting stem from the di¤erences in parameters r i , w i , l i , and c i .
A catalytic rebellion may take place when one player is signi…cantly stronger, while the other two have similar propensities for …ghting. Proposition 2 suggests that when provokes the rebellion, and are unwilling to take up arms even jointly with others (Assumption 4-(i)). However, as the rebellion evolves, they update their evaluation of the government's strength, so that they convince themselves that the challenge is worthwhile if the other also rebels (Assumption 3-(i)). Then they face the coordination dilemma. After a certain length T ; of 's battles, joint challenges by and in any period T + 1 can constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium as long as V Ca j1 (T jT T ; ) 0. A partial coalition is sought by a pair of players who are unwilling to rebel on their own, but who are willing to jointly challenge the government. 
Proof. Players and , but not , are willing to jointly …ght because (i) a rebellion is impossible without a coalition, and (ii) for and , the partially coordinated rebellion is preferred to permanent "acquiesce." On the other hand, is willing to acquiesce at least once (Assumption 4-(ii)). If and "win," …ghts immediately (Assumptions 2-(i) and 3-(i)). If they "lose," never …ghts (Assumption 3-(ii)).
Full coordination is most likely when power is distributed equally across the three players in the sense that no sole player or partial coalition is willing to …ght. Proof. The three players are willing to challenge concurrently because (i, ii) no other form of rebellion is incentive compatible, but (iii) they all prefer the fully coalitional rebellion to permanent "acquiesce."
If ther are more than three players, even more complicated patterns may emerge, but they still fall into some combination of these four patterns. . In this equilibrium, provokes the rebellion, joins in at T = 10 (with probability 0:509), and follows at T = 15 (with probability 0:428). If is as bellicose as when w = 8 (instead of 12), and …ght simultaneously at T ; 15, constituting a catalytic rebellion.
Numerical Example

Conclusion
This study contributes to the theoretical literature on war. Although multilateral war is di¢ cult to theorize (Jackson and Morelli 2011), recent studies have modeled it by simplifying some of its aspects (Krainin and Wiseman 2016) . Echoing this theoretical trend, we have formally analyzed a class of war fought between a hegemon and three challengers in order to demonstrate that a rebellion can break out and expand in one of the four patterns. Further theoretical studies of multilateral war are expected.
